[R-P] More about Serbia

Nestor Gorojovsky nestorgoro en fibertel.com.ar
Vie Mayo 11 18:47:04 MDT 2007


El informe, en realidad, exuda ideología imperialista y está lleno de 
falacias, Edgar. Los nacionalistas del PSS eran mucho más bravos y 
duros que los del Partido Radical de Seselj, que por otro lado no es 
(repito no es) de "ultraderecha". Al menos, fuera de la verborragia y 
en el enfrentamiento concreto los del PSS eran mucho más bravos 
porque no predicaban la desunión de los yugoslavos ni el hegemonismo 
serbio. 

Pero tus consideraciones generales son correctas, y las comparto. 

Por lo demás, no es cierto que los serbios suelan ir a contramano del 
resto de Europa. En realidad, van a favor de las tendencias 
revolucionarias en Europa.

Su patriotismo está íntima e inextrincablemente vinculado con todos 
los movimientos revolucionarios de Europa Continental a partir de la 
Revolución Francesa. Y esto vale tanto para unos como para otros: me 
consta.

Date sent:      	Fri, 11 May 2007 13:28:16 -0300 (ART)
From:           	Edgar Schmid <condornacional en yahoo.com.ar>
Subject:        	[R-P] More about Serbia
To:             	reconquista-popular en lists.econ.utah.edu

> CITANDO LA FUENTE,EL MATERIAL DE ESTA LISTA ES DE LIBRE REPRODUCCIÓN 
> 
> Realmente no sé si el nacionalismo serbio es burgués o
> no.
> 
> Tampoco me importa mucho. Lo que sí:
> 
> a. hay un bloque de nacionalistas moderados (si estos
> son los moderados, ¡que serán los exaltados!),
> social-nacionalistas, ultra-derechistas, nacionalistas
> "democráticos", nacionalistas de Nueva Serbia,
> nacionalistas de Milosevic (y como dijo el taxista de
> Belgrado: nacionalistas somos todos)
> 
> b. El caso es que derrotarían a los "modernizadores"
> pro-europeos (pro-European modernizers backed by
> Western European leaders)
> 
> c. Si ganan los nacion alistas, para la Unión Europea
> se pudre todo.
> 
> d. Los nacionalistas serbios tienen la puta costumbre
> de ir a contramano del resto de Europa.
> 
> e. Son como los clavos, más lo martillás, más se
> hunden en la madera.
> 
> Hay que aguantarlos porque, "el enemigo de mi enemigo
> es mi amigo"
> 
> ''Intelligence Brief: Serbian Nationalists Consolidate
> Influence''
> 
> The Serbian parliament elected the far right
> nationalist Tomislav Nikolic to the post of president
> on May 8. Moderate nationalists, led by Prime Minister
> Vojislav Kostunica, backed Nikolic and paved the way
> for the emergence of a social-nationalist bloc
> composed of the far right, the democratic
> nationalists, the New Serbia group, and the Socialists
> (political heirs of Slobodan Milosevic).
> 
> Due to Serbia's constitutional rules, fresh elections
> will be called for in July if the parliament is unable
> to agree on a new government by next Monday. If
> Serbians cast ballots in July, the social-nationalist
> parties will likely gain the upper hand against
> pro-European modernizers backed by Western European
> leaders.
> 
> If nationalist, anti-E.U. parties prevail by
> parliamentary or electoral means, the European Union's
> efforts to quickly integrate Serbia into the Union
> will suffer a critical setback. Such an outcome will
> increase geopolitical instability in the western
> Balkans, as Kosovo strives for independence from
> Belgrade. Moreover, the Serbian economy will likely
> suffer from higher political risk, at least in the
> short term.
> 
> Serbian nationalism is a deeply rooted sociological
> and political phenomenon and emanates from Serbian
> history. Notwithstanding the weakening of classical
> nationalism all over Europe in the 20th century,
> Serbian society and its political scene have their own
> specificity that cannot be read through the lenses of
> Western European pro-globalization ideology.
> 
> The Balkan wars in the 1990s and the deep frustration
> in Serbia that ensued from Yugoslavia's disintegration
> provided the social and ideological basis for the
> persistence of nationalism. The 1999 N.A.T.O. war
> against Belgrade aggravated Serbians further, even
> though many of them sincerely opposed Slobodan
> Milosevic's socialist rule.
> 
> Elites and citizens have never accepted Western
> support for Kosovo's ethnic Albanians and are unhappy
> with N.A.T.O.'s, the European Union's, and the United
> Nations' "soft treatment" of anti-Serbian movements
> and actions by Albanian nationalists. Moreover,
> Belgrade was unhappy with Montenegro's independence
> last year, both for domestic and geopolitical reasons.
> [See: "Intelligence Brief: Montenegro Votes for
> Independence"]
> 
> Serbian democratic institutions after the pivotal
> years of 1999-2000 and the end of Milosevic's rule
> have remained weak. Political instability has been
> dominant in the country, while the European Union has
> often proved overly optimistic in its expectations
> about its capability to normalize Serbia and to
> quickly integrate it into its political structures.
> 
> The Kosovo question remains unsettled, since Kosovo's
> ethnic Albanians keep pushing for national
> independence while Belgrade opposes it. The European
> Union does not look particularly happy to watch the
> birth of yet another country (Kosovo) and would prefer
> a federation, but it also seems unwilling to impose
> the latter on Kosovo's nationalists.
> 
> With Serbian nationalists again on the rise in
> Belgrade, the Kosovo question will probably become
> thornier, and the European Union will need to monitor
> the situation closely in order to anticipate possible
> outbursts of violence.
> 
> Moreover, Serbia's southern region of Sandzak, where a
> significant Muslim minority resides, has been the
> theater of intra-Muslim disputes recently as Wahhabi
> influence is growing.
> 
> Serbia's political instability will, therefore,
> augment geopolitical instability in the western
> Balkans, as Brussels strives to progressively
> integrate Bosnia, Croatia, Albania, the Former
> Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia,
> and possibly Kosovo.
> 
> Possible implications for decision-makers are
> significant both politically and economically.
> 
> First, political uncertainty in Serbia will increase
> political risk since hardliners in Belgrade may opt
> for stronger ties with Russia and strongly oppose
> liberal openings to the European Union's free market
> rules. Hence, foreign investment will likely be
> discouraged in the short run, which will slow Serbia's
> economic growth, complicating the European Union's
> plans.
> 
> Second, Russia's political influence will be enhanced,
> which will add to Moscow's leverage when it comes to
> ambitious energy transport projects to convey Black
> Sea and Caspian resources toward Austria and Italy
> through Serbia.
> 
> Belgrade also recently agreed to form joint ventures
> with Russian energy giant Gazprom in order to use
> Serbian territory as a hub for natural gas. Gas would
> be stocked in large quantities in special deposits in
> order to guarantee delivery continuity during winter
> or crises. Obviously, having anti-European leaders in
> Belgrade is not the best prospect for Western
> Europeans who seek to enhance energy security.
> 
> Serbia's nationalist turn and instability also
> complicates N.A.T.O.'s plans to resolve the Kosovo
> question quickly and to forge a stable security
> environment between the Adriatic and the so-called
> wider Black Sea region.
> 
> Anti-European nationalism will remain a fundamental
> political force in Serbia in the coming years. In the
> short-term, political uncertainty is likely to
> persist, and in the case of early elections in July,
> pro-European forces will suffer from citizens' low
> confidence in democratic institutions. Therefore, a
> strong pro-European course in Belgrade appears
> unlikely to take shape in the near future.
> 
> However, the economic implications of the
> anti-European turn could be negative for a country
> like Serbia, which has no strategic resources and lost
> its Adriatic outlet when Montenegro became
> independent. Weaker economic growth will likely create
> discontent in a country full of well-educated workers.
> Hence, in the medium term, modernizers could win the
> hearts and minds of Serbians since the country needs a
> stable and friendly environment to develop.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
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> 
> 
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Este correo lo ha enviado
Néstor Miguel Gorojovsky
nestorgoro en fibertel.com.ar
[No necesariamente es su autor]
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"La patria tiene que ser la dignidad arriba y el regocijo abajo".
Aparicio Saravia
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