[Marxism] Review of Peace Process
D OC
donaloc at hotmail.com
Wed Dec 13 10:40:44 MST 2006
On the dreadful book on the IRA by Ed Moloney - I wouldn't be recommending
it. His main sources would appear to be anti-SF, ex-Republican individuals
who have not even identified themselves. The book has a number of obvious
errors and a serious number of misrepresentations, it misses out any
discussion of the impact of the Hunger Strikes, leaves the internal
development within the RM undiscussed during the 1990s and fails to identify
the strategic importance of Canary wharf. The aim of the book is to sell
itself on the basis of salacious slurs and potentially to encourage internal
suspicion within SF. The problem is that it signally failed to do the latter
because it made some suggestions which were widely known to be just wrong.
If people want to get one book on recent history - then Peter Taylor's is
okay - something more on the long-war, then Bowyer-Bell is the best. Maloney
is like a Red-Top tabloid version with sensationalised accounts of stuff
most people either knew already or just doesn't seem important. One thing
that Philip says that is true is that it doesn't deal with the politics of
the transition only makes a one-sided and malicious presentation of its
content.
That Philip can spare the time to read this sort of tripe and to promote it
on a marxism list really says much more about him than I can explain. One of
the problems with this form of list is that those who are serious - and who
have be responsible - cannot discuss things openly or as fully as is
possible in private conversations. Suffice it to say, then, that the overall
impact of a book like that of Maloney on serious people - many of whom would
have went out and bought it with an open mind as to what it set out to prove
- where such things can be discussed in private was virtually nil. A serious
correspondent is limited as to exactly what they can write in public - a
revolutionary phrase-monger can make weak arguments and then dally onto the
next subject with as little care.
More widely a serious activist must make hard choices based on analysis -
unsure about whether they will work out or not - but together with others
discussing and reviewing all the time together. A revolutionary phrase
monger does not have to face up to hard choices, they instead just continue
to line up the hoops for compliance with inherited dogma and continue in
their little 'revolutionary circles' or in many cases on their as
cyber-warriors. An activist is not totally certain but characterised by
determination and hope for the future. Was it Gramsci - 'pessimism of the
intellect, optimism of the will'. A revolutionary phrase-monger is
cock-sure, pays little attention to the detail of arguments and lacks any
commitment to see the task through to the bitter end. I ask those serious
marxists to think about this and which one is described aptly.
The path which SF is pursuing is a challenging one. It cannot be otherwise
as the potential of a military campaign to succeed is highly remote and the
party must struggle towards its goals on the basis of winning mass support
for its positions and strategies.
I believe that Philip is making a mistake in trying to transpose the
categories of Russia 1917 to Ireland in 2006. In some way, this parallels
the mistake of Trotsky himself in transposing the Russian revolutionary
model to China in 1927. Indeed, he outdoes Trotsky as China was not at that
time in any way invaded by a foreign occupying force whereas Ireland is -
that fundamentally changes the scenario. I am glad, however, that he appears
to have clarified his position on the democratic revolution growing over
into the socialist revolution as opposed to the nonsense model of Permanent
Revolution.
He then tries to make the comparison with Nepal claiming that the Nepalese
maoist insurgency had not disarmed unlike the IRA only to be forced to admit
that it had signed up to it. Then, he claimed that the Nepalese guerillas
secured substantially more than the IRA had. He claims that they have
succeeded in deposing the Nepalese King (untrue so far) and that this is
better than Martin McGuinness getting one of the First Minister-deputy First
Minister positions in the north. Of course, this is a huge over
simplification and again, it absolutely fails to acknowledge the most
salient features of struggle in the north of Ireland today - those which
should be abcs for an materialist analysis i.e. number one that the IRA have
not proved capable of defeating the British although the British themselves
have not succeeded in beating the IRA either and, number two, that SF or
militant Republicans do not command any where near a majority level of
support across the island or even in the north. Comparing the situation with
that in Nepal where the Maoists were winning the insurgency war and where
they were commanding a huge level of popular support is absolutely mindless.
Comparing the relative gains made by both is even more stupid.
A serious analysis of the current situation cannot begin in 2006 but needs
to be set in the context of the now 800 year old struggle of Irish people
against the British military. I realise that not all readers might
understand all of this and might be unsure quite why the overwhelming
majority of Irish Republicans have followed their leadership into the Peace
Process. Moreover, they may be unsure from this list that this is even the
case and perhaps unaware that those who oppose SF from a purported
Republican viewpoint represent a political base of probably less than 1% of
the total population in the north.
The GFA represented a historic compromise for Republicans. As an agreement
it represented the relative balance of forces between the various parties to
the conflict in the north of Ireland. it involved significant concessions by
Republicans in particular represented a recognition by SF that it could not
dictate the terms of negotiations themselves and enforce the rightful
national sovereignty of the Irish people. As the only significant party on
the island to oppose the British-imposed principle of consent (which states
that the majority in the Six Counties have the right to determine when there
is reunification), SF was simply not powerful enough to force through the
overturning of this principle - which let us recall was specifically
acknowledged as being on the table in the negotiations by the British at the
time. The agreement did, however, recognise formally the right of the Irish
people as a whole to self-determination, conditional on this veto, but also
established Institutions of all-Ireland governance including parallel
participatory structures at every level in the interim. Furthermore, the
agreement included provisions for all governmental policies to be screened
as to their impact on equality, the provision for the development of a Bill
of Rights and a promised 'new beginning' to Policing in the north. It
represented a constitutional platform within which the British Act of Union
1800 and its amendment in 1921 were overturned - these gave the British
parliament final say over British union not the Irish people themselves - a
platform in which the Irish people would have the opportunity to achieve
independence albeit subject to the unionist majority in the north. It
represented a fundamental compromise to Republicanism - which had previous
to that simply demanded a British withdrawal and recognition of the
sovereignty of the Irish people taken as a whole. SF at no point accepted
the validity of the principle of consent but recognised that they would have
to work within a system on its basis.
Despite this however, it was decided by the overwhelming majority of Irish
Republicans that this process offered space to achieve their goal. The RM as
a whole went into the arrangements in order to achieve that. Some rejected
the strategy - most of whom did nothing but occasionally carp on with others
who had done nothing for years, a few of the dissenters went out on a very
unsuccessful bombing campaign which culminated in the Omagh bombing which
killed 31 civilians. It should be noted that no British soldier has been
shot since the IRA ceasefire despite the 'campaigns' of a number of
organisations. Some other organisations outside the RM decided to go on
their own ceasefire and conduct social struggles although these have
amounted to virtually nothing as has been admitted by John McAnulty on this
forum.
Some of what was promised in the GFA was delivered. Much was subject to
continued wrangling with other parties and subject to the British government
- which did not take long to move away from the terms of the agreement
applying unilateral authority with the tacit agreement of the Dublin
Government. SF which on signing the agreement had about 16% of the vote grew
in popularity both north and south of the border to the extent that it now
is the largest pro-Agreement political party in the north. This itself is
responsible for the continuation of the peace process as a process involving
continually more negotiations as the negotiations themselves reflect the
relative strengths of the contending parties.
Note that it is highly possible that if the DUP split on the putative deal
that they see before them, that SF might become the largest political party
in the north and acquire the apparently more important role of First
Minister of the north (the reality is that the powers of First
Minister-deputy First Minister are in actual fact tied together and
co-equal). The impact of the image of this alone on Unionist mindsets -
which are possibly only intelligible by comparison to the average Klansman
in the USA or an Afrikaner in old South Africa - can only be imagined. It
might destabilise the north to such an extent that the British pursue
direct-rule in conjunction with the Dublin Government until the north
finally is reabsorbed into a united Ireland.
It should be clear from the above presentation that SF is proactively
seeking to advance and popularise its struggle for Irish unity through
engaging with institutions. A natural consequence of that is that they will
have to adopt a position in relation to policing and justice institutions
themselves which are administrated in a period when the British still
maintain their occupation of the north. Not to be forgotten is the history
of these institutions which were responsible for sending approximately
10,000 (mainly) IRA volunteers to serve imprisonments over the course of the
last 30 years. That's about 2% of the entire nationalist population in the
north and maybe as much as about 5% of the male population over the age of
30. Over the course of the conflict the RUC (now PSNI) worked hand-in-glove
with loyalist killers, British security apparatus and with the UDR - a
unionist militia - to put down the IRA (sometimes INLA) campaign. They
killed civilians, tortured people and run agents who's sole purpose was
often merely to sow mistrust within the RM, gather information or else to
eliminate those who were considered dangerous. It is hard to imagine a more
difficult task than to have been an IRA commander during this period of
struggle.
So this is a very difficult position for Republicans and this is why people
like Gerry Kelly have indicated their determination to get Policing 'right'.
At the same time, not entering policing structures will have serious
implications for the progress of the Peace process and will allow the
enemies of Republicanism to continue to present SF as a collection of
criminals (Margaret Thatcher tried to portray the Republican struggle as
criminal as early as 1980 and this strategy continues to this day). People
who for decades have never contacted the largely unionist police force are
being forced to contact them through both political normalisation and
through the explosion in criminality which occurred as a result of the
prolonged absence of the IRA from the streets and fields.
SF are therefore demanding that the policing and justice systems be reformed
fundamentally. The bourgeois nationalist party, the SDLP, accepted the
initial reforms offered by the British in 1998 under the Patten reform which
created the PSNI. SF held firm and have seen these initial offerings
augmented through two subsequent British bills on Justice powers and three
further bills on Policing. There is another bill currently gone through
which enables the devolution of final control of Policing and Justice powers
at some future point - when all parties agree to it on a cross-community
basis - and this will represent a repatriation of control over policing
powers to the north. The British created accountability mechanisms including
an independent ombudsman, local boards composed of political parties (in
some areas with SF/nationalist majorities) with significant powers over
local police. There are also procedures allowing for the 'contracting out'
of policing to local policing services as identified by local policing
boards. Unionists have expressed concern that this will allow IRA units to
run policing in their own areas - although the British have denied this and
taken steps to exclude anyone found guilty of terrorism offences from such
activities. The bills also provide for community-run Community Restorative
Justice systems to be implemented which take an entirely different approach
to crime and criminality than that found in traditional western policing
textbooks and is based on community-led approaches to policing.
SF are still not satisfied with this, however, the party has made it clear
that it wants a clear timeframe for the transfer of powers and complete
separation between British security services (i.e. MI5) and the local civic
police service. As we speak, there is no indication that these demands have
been met by the British.
At the same time, political unionism has faced a crisis of unparalleled
proportions. On the night that the IRA ceasefire was declared the then
leader of the UUP forecast that it represented the greatest single challenge
to the stability of the Six County statelet. The UUP leader was not only
leader of the largest party in the north but the party which had created the
north and which had ruled it as a dictatorship from 1921 to 1972 when their
one-party and discriminatory statelet was prorogued by the British
Government in response to the rising conflict.
The UUP had maintained its rule through political gerrymandering
guaranteeing its ability to run the north despite lacking majorities in
areas. The UUP had also oversaw the creation of a near apartheid state where
everything was separated between Catholics and Protestants. The latter
received preferential employment and the former had to live at the margins.
This created a stimulus for Catholics to leave the north and not return
undercutting their population growth and securing the pro-British majority.
This preferential treatment was not restricted to the huge
military-industrial complex which grew out of a very militarised society but
was concentrated in the industrial base in the east, in the large
land-holdings of the west and even in Belfast port was expressed in a dry
dock (Protestants only) and a wet dock (Catholics doing the 'dirty work' for
less money). This situation largely remained in place until the 1990s and
was only undercut through the disinvestment by the British in its
manufacturing sector at that time.
The Peace Process must also be seen in the context of a very substantial
demographic change in the north. While politics cannot be simplified down to
headcounts, it is important both to account of rising nationalist confidence
and growing unionist fear. Currently Protestants outnumber Catholics 3 to 1
over the age of 65 yet Catholics outnumber Protestants 2 to 1 under the age
of 10. This does not mean that Republicans should await for 'the revenge of
the cradle' - as it would neither be sensible nor politically moral - but it
is of significance in understanding the context. Note also that the massive
demographic change is reflective of a number of factors not just simply
higher birth rates in Nationalists (i.e. Protestants live substantially
longer, child-bearing age Protestants are now emigrating in larger numbers
and the number of Catholics over 65 is smaller due to the past
discriminatory statelet which encourages their haemhorraging away from the
north).
Discrimination was not all a Catholic could expect in those times, many
lived in poverty stricken conditions, every July Catholics had to disappear
for the pro-British parades conducted by the Orange Order through their
areas. Some Catholics were murdered or shot by the Protestant militia the
B-specials - including one of my own - anticedent to the UDR (then RIR now
disbanded). There were sporadic campaigns by the IRA across the border but
these were limited by low levels of support and a negative attitude by the
Irish government. Labour struggles were restricted by the sectarian
division. The few marxists who did exist in the Protestant community and who
had been educated by Connolly were largely isolated by the 1930s by
sectarianism. Republicans were split on socialism with many holding greater
allegiance to the Catholic church and narrow-minded nationalism. The CP
itself was even split given the preponderance of pro-British trade unionists
in Belfast and the pro-Republican communists in the rest of Ireland.
The Agreement threatened that statelet. It is necessary to remember what it
was like living under Orange rule in the Orange statelet in Ireland. It is
all too easy to forget how much has already been achieved. One by one the
struts which held up the British state in Ireland have been undercut. The
Orange order can no longer walk down Catholic streets singing anti-papist
songs and making threats. Worse for them, this failure to continue their
traditions of intimidation has resulted in a fracturing of the order itself
and its chronic weakening. The monolithic UUP which ruled over the north for
decades was decimated at the last elections and seems like it will never
recover. The B-specials who changed uniforms to become the UDR and then the
RIR were just disbanded by a British government which felt that it didn't
need them any longer. The Justice system which underpinned injustice in the
north now is fundamentally reformed and much more open and accountable. Many
nationalist Catholics are rapidly climbing up its structures. The RUC (now
PSNI) is being reformed and it remains to be determined whether its
sectarian ethos can withstand the entry of SF into structures pending the
British changes. Already the force has unparalleled 'absence' rates among
its sectarian membership and is arguably more hated in pro-British working
class (Loyalist) areas than in Catholic ones these days. The British army
has retired to its bases and many of these have been removed including the
famous ones in South Armagh and in West Belfast.
In equality, the agenda of the Peace process has been largely frustrated.
This is mainly due to the instability of the institutions themselves and the
inherent sectarianism of many leading Civil servants in the north, who in
the absence of local politicians, have reverted to type. Contrary to what is
presented by anti-Republicans from the mainsteam, equality is still a huge
issue in the north. Unemployment differentials remain (particularly where
they are assess from a perspective of hidden unemployment). Catholics take
50% more time in Belfast to get a house on the housing list than
Protestants. For further details on the range of equality issues see recent
report by the Committee for the Administration of Justice.
The recent process has also seen the emergence of greater involvement in
politics by the trades unions, community sector and even business sectors.
This is largely because of the failure of the institutions to prove stable
enough to generate democratic leadership. This is of consequence to those
who seek genuine democratic change in Ireland in the long run and represents
a drastic change from the attitudes of these groups in prior periods of the
struggle.
Those who have argued from the sidelines against the process have actually
been further isolated as it has progressed. There is undoubtedly a
significant debate occuring within SF. For the first time, this is a
decision on which the party alone must make its judgement. The leadership
have indicated that it will be for the party itself to determine at an
extraordinary Ard Fheis - national conference - and that this will only be
called when the leadership themselves are satisfied that their demands for
considering it have been complied with.
That the main debate is occuring within SF itself and not among the anti-SF
micro-groups and assorted lunatic fringe parties is of significance. SF has
a mass support which its opponents recognise and will carry the people with
it. There are some who for all the reasons above find entering policing
arrangements under any circumstances a step too far. There are many others
who feel that SF should be in policing already. For most, however, this is
fundamentally a decision on the modalities of entry into Policing
structures. What is the minimum that will allow a forward moving dynamic to
unity?
The focus of this email has been primarily to explain the politics of the
Six County statelet. By necessity it cannot be provided without referencing
to the all-Ireland situation. The dramatic growth of the Celtic Tiger
economy has placed substantial impetus to business in the north, the EU, the
two Governments and even all parties talking up cross-border integration.
With every passing day, Ireland moves closer to unity in some regard.
At the same time, SF's social agenda is slowly gaining support in the Free
State - which remains difficult because of the rabid anti-SF attitude of its
media barons and state media. It is not admittedly overtly revolutionary but
focussed on measures to achieve equality. By its definition, this is a
bourgeois conception and relatively vacuous - however, it gives the party
enough room to maneuvre to gain support from those who have been left
marginalised by recent growth yet still make a strong case for Irish
reunification, make demands for structural changes to empower the people
themselves and to link the social and national struggles either side of the
border.
Phil no doubt would judge all this to be menshevism as per his little
oversimplified textbook of revolution. I anticipate that the same level of
analysis would have led the Philips of the world to adjudge Mao's book 'On
Coalition' or 'On New Democracy' as menshevik and maybe would result in a
characterisation of Ho's negotiations with the French in 1946 as a betrayal
of the struggle there at that time. None of these fall neatly into your
models.
The reality is that the preceding analysis is the level at which the
question of Policing in the Six Counties must be set. This represents both
the reality on the ground and in the popular mind.
I don't intend posting much more as this is becoming tedious making the same
points over and over again.
le meas,
DoC.
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